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Abstract: this work focuses on the study of the relationship between ownership structure and 
control of the company and its innovative activity. Taking Geroski's model as a starting point, its 
aim is to analyse the role that may be played by determinants within the company related to 
ownership structure when the decision to incur research and development costs is taken. 
Conclusions may be drawn from the analysis regarding the effect of mechanisms adopted to 
alleviate the problems of agency that arise because of the lack of identity between ownership 
and control in decision-making posts on the management o f innovative activities in the 
company. The study was carried out for the years 1994 and 2000, using a representative 
sample of Spanish manufacturing industries. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, companies have become aware of their need to encourage their capacity 
for innovation. This has reached the point where it has come to be understood as a continuous 
process that is not formulated in order to attain a specific objective, but instead one that is 
included in the company's strategy, becoming institutional. Companies feel that they are safer 
from possible competition by formalising their own innovations in the patents and trademarks 
register. All types of activities are involved in obtaining this objective - scientific, technological, 
organisational, financial and commercial. 
There is a great deal of recent literature which deals with the study of the determinants in 
innovation. These studies may be categorised as macroeconomic, which try to explain the 
potentialities in various geographical units in the field of innovation, and microeconomic studies, 
which analyse the internal determinants within the company to explain innovative efforts and 
results. Some questions such as the effect of the company’s size, its age, its degree co-
operation with other companies or financing, both internal and external, have been analysed in 
detail in the microeconomic studies. However, there have been few studies which have tried to 
explain the effect of variables, such as the decision-making structure or ownership and how 
they may influence decisions to invest in the company. 
A company's ability to innovate depends on a series of factors, in such a way that whether 
or not they are present has a favourable or unfavourable influence on the innovation process. 
These factors may be placed in the following groups: 
1.  The existence of favourable conditions in the demand structure or in the market size, in 
the life cycle of the products it manufactures, or in the evolution of scientific and 
technical means that it may use. 
2.  The resources that the company allocates to engineering, design, research and 
marketing. 
Moreover, the favourable conditions mentioned above and the company's technical capacity 
must be integrated in the framework of an innovative strategy, and then the following factors 
become involved: 
3.  The company's management and organisation. 
4.  Its desire to differentiate its products or processes from those of its competitors.   3 
Considering the possible significance of the company’s management and organisation with 
regard to its innovative activity, we feel that there is a need to analyse the characteristics of the 
ownership structure of the company - who owns it and how the control of decision-making is 
distributed, the nature of this control, the percentage of its capital owned by managers
1 and the 
level of concentration of ownership, among other issues. The characteristics that may lead to 
good management of the company's resources, both financial and physical, are innumerable. 
This will be determinant in the achievement of good results in the company's innovative 
process, which will determine its growth and its future. 
In order to draw conclusions regarding the  role of organisational strategy in business 
decisions, and in investment decisions in particular, it is necessary to consider the literature 
concerning capital structure in depth. The literature analysing the subject of ownership and 
control has provided interesting articles (Jensen, 1986; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Hermanlin and 
Weisbach, 1991; and Kole, 1995; among others), with the objective of studying how companies’ 
capital and financial structure determines their opportunities for growth. There are also articles 
in Spanish literature (Galve and Salas, 1993; De Andrés-Alonso et al., 2000; and Rodríguez, 
1996; among others). These have tried to explain companies’ results taking the structure of the 
company's share capital, the concentration of ownership and the type of main investor as 
explanatory variables. 
While there are some studies that contain models analysing the determinants of companies 
in the decision to invest in R & D (Crépon et al., 1996; Geroski and Pomroy, 1990; Beneito, 
2001; Love et al., 1996; and Gumbau, 1997; among others), there are very few that include any 
type of ownership structure variable in their study, which in the case of Spanish industry, have 
not been very widely disseminated. Other works analyse what the determinants are in the 
creation of the company's value, introducing variables which include the structure of capital and 
control of the company into their analysis, but in most cases they do not analyse the process of 
innovation, due to a lack of information. 
Our work focuses on the study of the relationship between company ownership and control 
structure and decisions to invest in innovation. Its aim, based on the literature both in the field of 
ownership structure and in the field of innovation, is to analyse the role that may be played by 
                                                 
1 In this study, we will use the terms “manager” and “director” indiscriminately to designate workers in decision-making 
positions.   4 
internal determinants in the company related to its ownership structure when taking the decision 
to incur R & D costs. Furthermore, when the control mechanisms for alleviating the possible 
agency problems arising due to the lack of identity between ownership and control are studied, 
it can be seen that they are directly related with companies' ownership structure. From the 
analysis carried out here, conclusions can thereby be drawn as to whether this type of 
mechanism plays a determinant role in the decisions to invest in innovations by the companies 
analysed. 
The article is structured in five parts. After the short introduction, which we have used as a 
guide to identify the determinants to be considered in our study, and the presentation of our 
objective, we briefly summarise the main theories concerning ownership structure in the 
following section. This section also contains a short review of the empirical literature in the field 
of ownership structure in company results. The third section describes the characteristics of the 
sample and the methodology followed. In the same section, the general objective is set out, 
establishing the hypotheses that we aim to test, and the variables considered in our analyses 
are discussed. The fourth section shows the results obtained during empirical research. Finally, 
the main conclusions drawn from our analysis are presented. 
 
2.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION. 
WORKING HYPOTHESIS. 
Articles based on the literature analysing the structure and control of the company base 
many of their results on two main theories - managerial company theory and the economic 
theory of organisations
2. Managerial company theory, in which the manager has complete 
freedom of action, argues that the managerial company reduces its profitability because of the 
differences between the manager’s objective function and the function of maximising profits for 
shareholders. The extensive economic theory of organisations argues that the structure of 
ownership and organisational design directly influences productive efficiency. Within this theory, 
there are three of the theories that have mainly been used to provide arguments for the results 
of this type of study  - agency theory, hierarchical bureaucracy theory and transaction cost 
theory. 
                                                 
2 For more information, see Milgrom and Roberts (1992).   5 
Agency theory specifically recognises the conflict of interests in companies with various 
owners, shareholders and creditors who in turn relate to a non-owning administrator, leading to 
alternative mechanisms being used (contracts, effective control, debt financing) in an attempt to 
overcome conflicts, respecting the limits imposed by the information available (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979). Hierarchical bureaucracy theory states that large companies are generally 
structured in hierarchical levels which are tools for the co-ordination and transmission of 
information, as well as instruments for hierarchical control and supervision. The hierarchy 
carries out these functions imperfectly, so that often the level of imperfection, and with it, the 
company’s overall efficiency varies depending on the company's size and its control situation. 
Finally, transaction cost theory demonstrates that once again, "the total can be greater than the 
sum of the parts". 
Many studies, on an empirical level, have attempted to study the importance of ownership 
structure on a company's possibilities for growth and success and therefore to what extent the 
questions analysed by the various managerial company theories and the economic theory of 
organisations are confirmed in the field to which they are replied. Given that in this study we 
start with the idea that this question is deeply related to the company’s opportunities for 
obtaining innovative results providing it with future growth, their conclusions may be of interest 
to our study. 
Among the works analysing the relationship between capital structure and opportunities for 
growth are those by Smith and Watts (1992) and Lasfer (1995). The first analyses how 
financing decisions, on the one hand, and management remuneration policy, on the other, may 
influence the company's investments and opportunities for growth, with a negative relationship 
obtained between opportunities for growth and debt, something which provides the opportunity 
to regulate the agency conflicts affecting them. Lasfer's work confirms the positive influence of 
"leverage"
3 on those cases in which the company does not have valuable opportunities for 
growth, as proposed by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990). Himmelberg et al. (1999) also 
analyses the determinants of company value by applying panel data, arguing that the 
heterogeneity that is not observed generates a spurious correlation between ownership and 
opportunities for growth. 
                                                 
3 “Leverage” is understood to be the effect that occurs on risk and the level of variability in a company’s results due to 
the effect of having increased external financing.   6 
By carrying out a short review of the literature which relates Tobin's Q r atio
4 with the 
"managerial ownership"
5 variable, it can be seen that the creation of value has no relationship of 
a lineal nature with ownership, as the value of the company increases and decreases for 
various proportions of ownership in the hands of its directors. Among the studies analysing this 
area are several that obtain an inverted U-shaped relationship (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Mørck et al., 1988; Holderness et al., 1999). The study by Kole (1995) examines the differences 
in the works mentioned above and concludes that differences in business size may lead to 
differences in the conclusions drawn by this type of work. Moreover, they do not take into 
account the problem of endogeneity involved in the use of the variable "managerial ownership" 
as an explanatory variable, as noted by Jensen and Warner (1988). 
Leech and Leahy (1991) carry out a study using data from British companies, with the aim 
of describing the ownership structure of a sample of large companies and carrying out an 
econometric analysis of its causes and consequences in terms of control and incentives. They 
feel that the ownership structure and its level of concentration have an important role in the 
growth of the company. Using the regression model in which including variables related to the 
utility functions of the directors, shareholders and owners, they conclude that the company's 
opportunity for growth depends on the concentration of ownership and the directors' control. 
In Spain, Galve and Salas (1993) carried out an empirical study with the aim of analysing 
the shareholding composition of Spanish companies and to check whether there were 
differences in the financial results that were attributable to the type of the owner group 
controlling the company. They gave details of the mechanism by which the ownership-control 
influences results, with a positive relation shown between concentration of ownership and the 
results obtained by the company, as well as family ownership type. In the work by De Andrés-
Alonso et al. (2000), which aimed to study the impact of the decision to become indebted and 
contractual structure on the market value of companies, the conclusion is drawn that 
concentration of ownership is a harmful influence in the presence of opportunities for growth. A 
positive relationship between directors' shareholdings and the creation of value in the absence 
of opportunities is not proved.  
                                                 
4 Tobin’s Q ratio is a proxy valuable in the creation of value. One of the most often used ratios is the quotient between 
the value of shares and the sum of the company’s debt in the financial market and the cost of repositioning its real 
assets.   7 
Literature concerning ownership structure and its effect on the growth of companies has 
been analysed up to this point. However, as far as we know, there are hardly any works 
concerning the role that may be played by a company's ownership structure and the way in 
which it is constituted and administered on decisions as important as the innovative strategy to 
be adopted. Some aspects related to  ownership structure, among other questions, are only 
analysed in the works by Love et al. (1996), Dixon and Seddighi (1996) and Acs and Isberg 
(1991). In the first of these, a sample of Scottish companies is analysed, with the conclusion 
that foreign ownership has a positive effect on the probability of a company located in Scotland 
obtaining product innovations. In the work by Dixon and Seddighi, carried out with a sample of 
English companies, the effect of the type of ownership (domestic or foreign) is analysed. In this 
work, as well as that by Acs and Isberg, it is independent of the innovation carried out by the 
company. 
There are various control mechanisms which the company can use to alleviate agency 
problems arising from the lack of identity between ownership and control in decision-making 
positions. The economic literature clearly shows the concentration of ownership in the hands of 
a small number of owners, the incentive involved in giving managers significant shareholdings 
in the company and the use of debt. For example, the work by Rodríguez (1996) shows how the 
ownership control mechanism, in its various senses, is evidence of its participation in the 
conflicts of interest arising in the company, with an even greater importance than a direct 
shareholding. There is also confirmation of the fact that when ownership is concentrated in few 
hands, this may lead to more favourable results when carrying out projects of a high risk nature. 
Considering the information analysed above, we are now able to specify our objectives. 
Based on a model which analyses the decision to innovate, we aim to analyse the effects of 
control mechanisms designed to alleviate possible agency problems on business decisions in 
the innovation field. Our study will focus mainly on ownership concentration mechanisms, debt 
financing and the effects related to increases in the shareholdings of owners in decision-making 
posts. Furthermore, an analysis will also be carried out of the effect of foreign and public 
ownership of the company's share capital on the decision to incur R & D costs. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
5 We understand “managerial ownership” to be an aspect showing the percentage of shares or ownership in the hands 
of managers or directors.   8 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
3.1. METHODOLOGY 
Considering that our objective is to analyse the impact of several aspects related to 
ownership structure and management/control of the company on the decision to innovate, the 
underlying model in the empirical analysis to be carried out is the one produced by Geroski 
(1990). 
Geroski’s model (1990), which was later included in other articles (Crépon et al., 1996; Love 
et al., 1996), is a logistic model which relates market structure and innovation, based on the 
following function: 
u Z S M I i 4 j 3 i 2
e
i 1 0 I + b + b + b + p b + b =  
where  
x + a + a + a = p i 3 j 2 i 1
e
i Z S M  
dependent variable I is a continuous unobservable variable (the company innovates if the 
variable is positive); p
e is the anticipated benefit from innovating, M is the company's degree of 
monopoly, S is a vector of market structure variables and Z is a vector of company structure and 
factors influencing the company's ability to innovate. 
The amount of  p
e is an expectation, meaning that it is not directly observable, although in 
balanced conditions, maximising of profits may be defined as a function that depends on the 
company's market power, and on the industry's and company's internal characteristics. 
If the function of anticipated profits is input in the investment function, we obtain a function 
in which all explanatory variables are observable, including both the direct and indirect effects of 
the explanatory variables: 
                m Z S M I i 3 j 2 i 1 0 i + l + l + l + l =                                    
) , , ( 4 3 1 3 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 b + a b = l b + b a = l b + b a = l  
Because of the wide range of explanatory variables (many of which may be qualitative), the 
author has chosen to give the dependent variable the form of a dichotomous variable, which 
has a value equal to the unit if the company innovates and a null value if it does not. This work 
will be the basis for the first of the models that will be estimated in this study.   9 
As a result, given the binary nature of the endogenous variable for analysis, the decision 
whether or not to invest in innovation, specifying a discreet choice model is considered 
appropriate, selecting the logistic model estimated using the maximum likelihood method. Due 
to the fact that in this type of model the first order conditions are not lineal, the estimated 
parameters are obtained using iterative procedures. While the parameters are not easy to 
interpret, their sign shows us the direction of the effect caused by the explanatory variable on 
the endogenous variable
6. In this type of model, the quotients between the estimated values of 
two parameters measure the relative importance of the effects that the explanatory variables 
associated with these parameters have on the probability of selecting the Y i=1 alternative. 
Because of this property, w hile the coefficients of a logit model are not directly interpretable, 
their relative values are. 
Taking into account the theoretical model mentioned above and the hypotheses that we aim 
to test, the next step is to analyse the variables found to be relevant for our analysis. As a 
dependent variable, the innovation input variable INNOV is a dichotomous variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the company has incurred some R & D expense over the year, and a null value 
if not. 
Considering the objectives stated in the previous section, in order to analyse the impact that 
the various control mechanisms may have on the company's innovative activity, our study has 
included the following ownership structure and control variables. The variable SHARE includes 
information regarding the level of concentration of ownership, showing the percentage of the 
company's share capital that is in the hands of another company or group. The variable OWN is 
the percentage of owners or family members in management positions in the company's total 
staff as of 31st December in the year analysed. The variable DEBT is the percentage of 
financing with debt compared to the company's total financing. As far as information concerning 
the type of control is concerned, we consider two variables, EXT and PUB. The first includes the 
percentage shareholding by foreign capital either directly or indirectly (through a company that 
is more than 50% controlled by foreign shareholders), and the variable PUB is the percentage 
of direct or indirect public shareholding (through a company that is more than 50% controlled by 
public shareholding). The variable showing the effects of the corporation is the variable FORM, 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed explanation of the logit model, see Econometrics manuals such as those by Novales (1993) or 
Greene (1998).   10 
a categorical variable which classifies companies according to their legal status - single-member 
company, limited company, public limited company, worker-owned limited company, workers’ 
co-operative and others. The variable STOCK is a dichotomous variable, which takes the value 
of the unit when the company is quoted on the Stock Exchange, and a null value when it is not. 
Furthermore, a range of variables regarding the company's internal structure is considered to 
check the effect that its general characteristics may have on its innovation. These aspects have 
been widely analysed in the literature. Problems of bias are thereby avoided in the coefficients 
of the variables related to the company's ownership structure, which are the main focus of this 
study. 
As far as the company's internal structure variables are concerned, the variable SIZE, a 
variable showing the size of the business, includes the total personnel numbers as of 31st 
December. The variable AGE, the variable showing the company’s age or maturity, shows how 
many years have passed since the company was founded. Finally, the variable OPORT
7 shows 
information regarding its business sector, and is a categorical variable classifying companies 
according to the level of technological opportunity in the business sector to which they belong, 
in sectors of low, medium or higher opportunities. 
Like t he models mentioned above, in order to include the effect of the structure of the 
market in which the company works, the variable MARKET has been included, which provides 
information regarding the geographical extent of the main market. Companies are classified 
according to whether their market is local, provincial, regional, national or foreign in nature. 
Having commented on the variables to be included in our model, it is shown below: 
 
i i 9 i 8 i 7 i 6
i 5 i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 0 i
u MARKET DEBT OWN SHARE
STOCK FORM OPORT AGE SIZE INNOV
+ b + b + b + b +





                                                 
7 The following have been classified as high technological opportunity sectors: office machinery, computer, processing, 
optical and similar equipment; chemical products; machinery and mechanical equipment; electrical and electronic 
machinery and material; motors and autos; other transport material, publishing and  graphic arts. As medium 
technological opportunity sectors: the meat industry; food and tobacco products; beverages; rubber and plastics; non-
metallic mineral products; Metallurgy; metal  products. And as low technological opportunity sectors: Textiles and 
clothing, leather and footwear, wood; Paper; Furniture and other manufacturing industries.   11 
3.2. DATABASE
8 
The database used is the Survey of Entrepreneurial Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales, henceforth ESEE) produced by the “Public Enterprise Foundation” of Spain for 
what is today the Ministry of Science and Technology (previously the Ministry of Industry and 
Energy). The Public Enterprise Foundation's Economic Research Programme designed the 
survey, supervises its annual production and maintains the database. The ESEE is a statistical 
research project that surveys a panel of companies representing manufacturing industries in 
Spain on an annual basis. Its design is relatively flexible and it is suitable for two types of 
potential use. On the one hand, it provides in-depth knowledge and analysis of the industrial 
sector's evolution over time by means of multiple data concerning the business and decisions of 
companies in the sector. The ESEE is also designed to generate micro-economic information 
that enables econometric models to be specified and tested. 
As far as its coverage is concerned, the reference population of the ESEE is companies 
with 10 or more workers in what is usually known as manufacturing industry. The geographical 
area of reference is Spain, and the variables have a timescale of one year. One of the most 
outstanding characteristics of the ESEE is  its representativeness. The initial selection of 
companies took place by combining thoroughness criteria and a random sample. Companies 
with more than 200 workers were included in the first group, which were requested to participate 
thoroughly. The second group was formed by companies with between 10 and 200 employees, 
which was selected by stratification sampling, proportional with restrictions and systematic with 
a random start-up. This is a random sample of the crosses of the 21 CNAE manufacturing 
activities to two digits and for employment intervals: 2-10, 21-50, 51-100 and 100-200 workers. 
The ESEE has data available for Spanish companies since 1990. 
Once the variables were presented, and in order to place the information within the 
framework that we are going to use in our study, we considered it useful to give an initial idea 
that regarding the variables that will be used in the years under consideration (Tables 1 and 2)
9. 
Table 1 shows some statistics describing the quantitative variables in the study. It can be seen 
that the average concentration of capital in the hands of few shareholders (SHARE) increases 
                                                 
8 For more information concerning the database, see Fariñas and Huergo (1999), Fariñas and Jaumandreu (1994, 
1999).   12 
with time, while its dispersion also increases. This means that it can be concluded that some 
companies decided to move from more diffuse controls to more effective controls as a possible 
control mechanism in the face of agency problems between ownership and control. It can also 
be seen that over time, there is an increase, albeit a slight one, in the percentage of foreign 
shareholding, i.e. foreign-owned shares have an increasing influence in the share capital of 
Spanish companies, which may also have an effect on their business results. However, it can 
be seen that percentage of public shareholding decreases overtime, due to the privatisation 
processes undergone in recent years in the Spanish economy. As regards the variable OWN, 
the variable which shows identity between ownership and control, it can be seen that it seems 
to have experienced a decline in the percentage of owners in control positions. It should be 
remembered that this variable may not entirely explain what we are trying to measure, as it may 
be that everybody who has shares in the company is being considered. In fact, one of the 
control mechanisms to prevent agency problems is to provide the manager with part of the 
company’s shares, to establish a link between management and ownership. This link may act 
on management as a possible motivation, so that it may act according to similar criteria to those 
on which the owner would act, i.e. trying to carry out profit maximisation without incurring in 
over-investments or investments that are too risky and may endanger the company's health. 
Finally, the variable DEBT, which includes the percentage of external financing compared to the 
total financing, undergoes a slight increase with time. As far as the average size and age of the 
companies considered is concerned, these are medium-sized companies (with an average of 
278 workers), which have been stable with the passing of time, and which have an average age 
of 23 years. 
As far as variables of a qualitative nature are concerned, as a prior analysis to the 
estimation of the model, Table 2 is added, which shows the percentages of companies that 
state they have invested in R & D in each category and in the years analysed.  The results 
clearly show on a general scale that companies that do invest in R & D are a small percentage 
of the total number of companies, although this percentage increases with the passing of time. 
As a summary of the results of the various variables analysed, with regard to the legal status 
variable (FORM), the most interesting results are the differences between the categories. The 
                                                                                                                                               
9 The years 1994 (number of available observations: 1869) and 2000 (number of available observations: 1754) have 
been selected because they were at the beginning and the end of the years sampled which contain all the necessary   13 
categories with the highest percentage of R&D costs are “Joint stock companies” and “workers 
co-operatives”, and a large increase in the percentage of the latter category between the two 
years analysed can be seen. This type of legal status presumably has a separation between 
ownership and control because of the great dispersion of ownership, and as Jensen (1986) 
argued, administrators' behaviour tends towards reinvestment of the resources generated rather 
than returns to shareholders. When the two years analysed are compared, the reduction of the 
percentage in the "single-member company" category is significant. This is not the case with the 
other categories, which increase their percentage in the year 2000. 
With regard to the variable which tells us whether or not the company is quoted on the 
Stock Exchange (STOCK), it is significant that practically all the companies quoted on the Stock 
Exchange invest in innovation. This result which seems to tell us that this variable may be 
determinant for companies if they have R & D costs. As anticipated, for the technological 
opportunity variable (OPORT), the category showing the highest percentage of investment in R 
& D is the category "high technological opportunity", with half the companies in this category 
having R & D costs. When the two years analysed are compared, there is an increase in the 
percentages for all categories of the variable. Finally, the table shows the analysis for the 
geographical extent of the main market (MARKET). It can be seen how as the extent of the 
geographical market increases, the percentage of companies making an investment in 
innovation increases. When the two years are compared, we can see that an increase does not 
take place in all categories of this variable, as occurs in all the other variables analysed in the 
table. In the widest-ranging geographical categories, "Spain", "foreign" and "Spain and abroad", 
instead of an increase in the percentage, which should in principle be anticipated, there is a 
decrease. 
Finally, Tables 3 and 4 shows the correlation matrices between the variables considered in 
our model for the two years analysed, with the lack of problems of high colineality between them 
clearly visible. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
                                                                                                                                               
variables for our study.   14 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results from the estimation of the logistical model which explains 
the decision to incur R & D
10 costs for the years 1994 and 2000 respectively. The main factor is 
the important explanatory role of the variables of ownership structure and control type in 
companies' innovative activity. 
All the variables that we have defined as variables in the company's internal structure are 
significant for the two years studied, providing the same conclusions. As was to be expected, 
both size (SIZE) and age (AGE) presented a positive parameter, leading to the conclusion that 
the bigger and older the company is, the more likely it is to incur R & D costs. This result is in 
line with those obtained by many authors. With regard to the size variable, the study by 
Schumpeter (1942) suggested this influence of size on this type of analysis. There are 
theoretical works which argue that larger companies have potentialities such as obtaining 
economies of scale, decreased risk, a larger market and greater opportunities for appropriation 
(Fernández, E., 1996). Despite the unanimity of the theoretical works, from the empirical point 
of view there is a great deal of disparity in results. There are both studies with a positive result 
in the relationship between size and innovation (Scherer, 1992; Scherer and Ros, 1990; Love et 
al., 1990; Cohen and Kleeper, 1996; among others), and others that have not been able to 
confirm this  positive influence of size (Mansfield, 1964; Acs and Audretsch, 1991; among 
others). For the case of Spain, there are many studies that have aimed to confirm the effect of 
the size variable on innovation (Labeaga and Martinez-Ros, 1994; Gumbau, 1994, 1997; Molero 
and Buesa, 1996; Fariñas and Huergo, 1999; Beneito, 2001, 2002; among others) which have 
reached the same conclusion as Schumpeter, especially in the industrial sector. The age 
variable (AGE) was also one of the most checked determinants by the literature, with the 
conclusion drawn by us reached on most occasions. 
With regard to the variable concerning technological opportunity in the sector (OPORT), it 
can be seen how those companies with a low technological opportunity have a lower probability 
of carrying out R & D than those in the base category
11 (medium technological opportunity). On 
                                                 
10 The selection criteria for the base category in the categorical variables focused on selecting the category with the 
most frequency. Hence for the variable of legal status (FORM) the category “Limited Company”, was chosen, while for 
technological opportunity of the sector, (OPORT), it was “medium opportunity”. For the variable of whether or not the 
company was quoted on the Stock Exchange (STOCK) the category “not quoted on the Stock Exchange” was chosen, 
and for the main market (MARKET) “Spain” was chosen. It will be determinant for the study to remember these 
categories as using the Odds-ratio we can see whether there is a higher or lower probability of investing in R & D or 
patenting comparing the other categories with the category chosen as the base. 
11 For the purposes of interpretation, it should be remembered that the Odds-ratios of each of the categories should be 
interpreted with regard to the category selected as the base fixed in the unit. Consequently, an Odds-ratio of more than   15 
the other hand, in a result which was to be anticipated, those with greater technological 
opportunities have a higher probability of incurring R & D expenses. Many authors have also 
obtained the same conclusions  - belonging to a business sector with a high level of 
technological complexity is a determinant when innovating (for example, Coronado and Acosta, 
1999; Gumbau, 1994, 1997; Scherer, 1965; Cohen and Levin, 1989; Paricio, 1993; Kraft, 1989). 
As far as the variables of ownership structure and control are concerned, we saw that all 
legal statuses other than limited companies have a lower probability of incurring R & D costs. 
However, it should be remembered that the categories of "Workers incorporated" and "workers 
co-operatives" and "others" are not significant in either of the years analysed. One possible 
explanation for this may be found in the characteristics of these legal statuses, which include 
larger companies which mostly have a disperse ownership. These factors may be influencing 
the decision to carry out investment in R & D.  
Looking at the variable which states whether or not the company is quoted on the Stock 
Exchange (STOCK), it can be seen that this is not significant in 1994. However, in the year 
2000, when it is significant, its Odds-ratio shows us that companies quoted on the Stock 
Exchange have almost double the probability of incurring R & D expenses than companies that 
do not.  
The variable showing ownership concentration (SHARE), is significant and has a positive 
parameter, meaning that the greater the concentration of capital in the hands of few people, the 
higher probability of incurring R & D costs. We consider that companies in a position of effective 
control (we understand a situation of effective control to be the largest homogenous group of 
shareholders possessing at least 50% of shares) have a higher probability of carrying out 
investment in R & D. This higher concentration may be acting as a mechanism to relieve 
agency problems arising from the lack of identity between ownership and control. This is a 
result that may corroborate some studies for the Spanish case, which attempts to measure the 
effect of concentration of ownership of Spanish companies on their results. 
The variable showing identity between ownership and control (OWN) tells us that the 
greater the percentage of owners or relatives in management positions with regard to the total 
number of employees, the lower the probability of R & D being incurred. This is showing us that 
                                                                                                                                               
1 would imply that a slight increase in this variable has an effect, greater than that of the base category,  on the 
probability of a company deciding to invest in R & D.   16 
the fact that there is an identity between ownership and control makes the probability of 
incurring R & D costs decline. As pointed out by Rodríguez (1996), the separation between the 
functions of ownership and management, as well as the appearance of widely diffuse ownership 
structures (the introduction of other businesses in the company's shareholding) are phenomena 
that are easy to prove in the vast majority of companies at present (as in the limited company 
legal status mentioned previously). This separation of functions implies a series of advantages, 
mainly of specialisation, which businesses cannot ignore. In their study in 1976, Jensen and 
Meckling noted that there was a problem of free-riding, according to which given the information 
that investors have on the company's activities is usually limited or not precise, they may have 
the incentive to involve the company in growth rates above optimal levels instead of trying to 
maximise its market value, as noted by Jensen (1986). When directors are the people 
controlling this type of resource, there is the risk of an unproductive or inappropriate use of 
resources. The solution to this type of conflict must of necessity involve providing managers 
with the incentive to distribute these resources as against investing them in projects with a 
negative net current value. To ensure this type of conduct, the management team has two basic 
tools at its disposition. Firstly, an increase in financing in the form of debt, w hich obliges the 
manager to release the free resources that the company has generated. Secondly, greater 
control by investors by means of a concentration of ownership (an instrument used in Spanish 
industry, as we have seen) which acts as a supervision mechanism for the poor use that 
management may make of these resources. In this latter case, managers' shareholding in the 
company may also contribute to putting a stop to sub-optimal investment policies. 
The variable for measuring the effect of the financing mechanism in the form of debt used to 
control investment activities carried out by the manager (DEBT) does not appear to be a 
significant variable in the decision to carry out investments in R & D. Our results are in 
agreement with some authors who argue that financing with debt has an ambiguous effect as a 
mechanism for mitigating agency problems (Hall, 1992; Chiao, 2002). An increase in the level of 
indebtedness may lead to increased conflict between shareholders and bondholders. However, 
this increase m ay mitigate the divergences of interests between internal and external 
shareholders and management, as well as providing valuable information regarding business 
perspectives. In line with the previous comment, there are authors who have obtained   17 
conclusions that are similar to ours. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that financing in the 
form of debt leads to the adoption of investment projects with excessive risk. According to them, 
the contribution made by shareholders to the company has limited responsibility, so that 
shareholders prefer management to adopt risky investment projects which offer the opportunity 
to obtain higher profits and in which the increased probability of loss only affects the holder of 
the debt. However, the latter prefer less risky projects enabling surer recovery of the value of 
their contribution. Among the works dealing with the Spanish situation, that by Azofra et al. 
(1995) obtains a negative relationship between indebtedness and the valuation ratio. It can be 
seen in this study how those companies with intangible assets or good opportunities for growth, 
and a consequence, higher valuation ratios, tend to resort to debt to a lesser extent. It can also 
be seen how a positive valuation by the market is synonymous with a high capacity of internal 
resources which therefore enables external financing to be dispensed with.  
Finally, the variable dealing with the geographical extent of the main market in which the 
company operates (MARKET) shows the effect that the company deciding to expand its market 
to a wider region may have. This variable includes various questions. Firstly, there is the fact 
that companies that are classified in the categories of the widest geographical extent (Spain, 
abroad, and Spain and abroad) are in principle larger and more mature companies. Because of 
this, we find companies that have a potentiality to incur R & D costs in their internal 
characteristics (size, years since establishment). This variable also shows the effect of demand 
on the decision to invest in improving the product, so that product innovations are determinant 
in this situation
12. In this field, an important role is played by dealing with a wider geographical 
area. International competition is more diverse and more intense than competition in smaller 
geographical areas, meaning that internal capacities must be improved by more risky 
advertising or innovation expenses in order to obtain a safe market share. We can see that this 
is a significant variable in the two years studied, with the estimated parameters of the categories 
smaller than Spain (the base category) are negative, and are positive for parameters that are 
greater (abroad and Spain and abroad). The Odds-ratio presents values parallel to the 
parameters, i.e. it can be seen how the probability of taking the decisions to incur R & D costs is 
lower for geographical areas smaller than Spain, while the probability increases as the 
                                                 
12 This aspect is included in the study by González and Jaumandreu (1998), who study the decision to carry out product 
innovations for a sample of Spanish companies.   18 
geographical area expands, and is highest for the areas of Spain and abroad and only abroad, 
with the latter always having the highest probability. This result corroborates the one obtained in 
other studies, such as those by Gumbau (1997), Geroski (1990), Love et al. (1996) and 
Mansfield (1981,1986). 
In order to provide more detail regarding the analysis of the effect of the type of control on 
the decision to invest in R & D, a second model has been estimated, in which the variable 
SHARE has been replaced by two variables which show firstly, the percentage of foreign share 
capital, and secondly, the percentage of public ownership: 
i i 10 i 9 i 8 i 7 i 6
i 5 i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 0 i
u MARKET DEBT OWN PUB EXT
STOCK FORM OPORT AGE SIZE INNOV
+ b + b + b + b + b +
+ b + b + b + b + b + b =
 
(Model 1 b) 
 
The same results can be seen (Tables 7 and 8) in the two years analysed. The type of 
control, both foreign (EXT) and public (PUB) are not significant for either of the years analysed. 
The opposite result is  obtained by some authors, such as Buesa and Molero (1996), who 
carried out a study on a sample of Madrid companies, in which the probability of carrying out 
innovation was greater in the group of foreign or public-controlled companies. Nevertheless, our 
result is in line with the one obtained in the work by Dixon and Seddighi (1996), who also did not 
find any relationship between the type of ownership and business innovation. 
An additional comment in this type of models is their high predictive potential. T he 
prediction potential of a model estimated with logistical methodology is carried out by means of 
what are known as "classification tables", which compare the responses are observed with the 
predicted responses in the implemented model. There is a high p ercentage of correct 
classification in the estimated models, which in all cases is between 76% and 78%. 
As a complement, a graph has been produced, comparing the behaviour of the probability 
of incurring R & D expenses for the two years, using various observation criteria and calculating 
the normal distribution. Using model 1 as a starting point, a study is carried out of the effect of 
various variables related to the internal structure and ownership of the company (SIZE, AGE,   19 
SHARE, OWN) on the probability of carrying out R & D. To this end, two companies
13 are 
compared which have the same characteristics but which vary in one single comparison 
criterion. In figures 1 and 2, we compare the probability of innovating for two companies with 
different sector technological opportunities (OPORT) according to their size and age, 
respectively. 
 




















                                                 
13 The company profiles that have been selected have the following characteristics: in the quantitative variables SIZE, 
AGE, SHARE, OWN and DEBT, the annual average has been chosen as the value (when they were not chosen as a 
variable for observation). As far as the categorical variables are concerned, the legal status of limited company, quoted 
on the Stock Exchange and with a main market abroad was chosen. In order to be able to represent the most significant 
values of the variables to be analysed, the sample was divided into forty groups and their averages were calculated, and 
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As is to be expected, it can be seen that as company size (SIZE) increases, the probability 
of investing in R & D also increases, although the probability is much greater in the company 
with a higher technological opportunity. Similarly, as the number of years since the founding of 
the company (AGE) increases, the probability of investing in R & D increases. The effect of the 
company's age is greater in companies with high levels of technological opportunity. 
Below, we show a graph of the effect of an increase in the use of control mechanisms on 
possible agency problems, maintaining the same business profile criteria used in this study of 
the company's internal variables. 
 
Figure 3. Probability of investing in R & D according 










As far as a concentration of capital is concerned (figure 3), it can be seen how as this 
concentration increases, an increase in the probability of investing in R & D takes place. This 
mechanism has a greater effect in companies with a high level of technological opportunity than 
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Figure 4. Probability of investing in R & D according to owner’s participation 










Finally, a study was carried out observing how increases in the percentage of owners in 
decision-making posts compared to the total number of employees (OWN) may affect the 
probability of making investments in R & D (Figure 4). As can be seen, as the percentage 
increases, the probability of investing in R & D declines. It can also be seen that the effect is 





This study has tried to analyse the effect that various questions related with ownership 
structure and control of companies have on their decision to make investments in R & D. It also 
comes to conclusions regarding the effect of certain control mechanisms used to alleviate 
possible agency problems arising from the separation between ownership and control may have 
on the probability of investing in R & D. 
As shown in the data, and as noted by various authors (Rodríguez et al., 1994; Alonso and 
De Andrés-Alonso, 2002) the ownership structure of Spanish companies does not meet the 
standards of separation between ownership and control and the existence of a large number of 
small investors, as is the case in the United States. The Spanish case is included within the 
                                                 
14 While the same graphs have been produced for the year 2000, they are not shown in this work, as the results 
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European or continental model, in which the concentration of ownership has a mechanism for 
reducing agency problems predominates. 
In view of the results obtained, we can draw some conclusions regarding the use of control 
mechanisms in resolving agency problems in the administration of business decisions. While 
this type of mechanism leads to the reduction of agency problems in moral risk arising in 
informational asymmetries between administrators and shareholders, they may have a number 
of disadvantages associated with the reduction in action on the part of the administrators. 
With regard to the mechanism based on the concentration of capital in a small number of 
owners, it can be seen that it is one of the mechanisms applied by the company studied. This 
mechanism has a range of associated disadvantages, related to the increased risk borne by the 
owners (due to the reduction in their number to obtain greater control levels), less liquidity in 
markets and fewer opportunities for negotiation of the company's values. As can be seen in our 
study, it is a mechanism that favours carrying out investments in innovation, due to the higher 
levels of supervision of administrators' work and the reduction of the problem of opportunism 
that arises in companies with the future controls. Greater control over administrators leads to an 
increase in business profitability, because it leads to behaviour that is closer to the maximisation 
of profits. 
The second control mechanism that the study considers is the effect of the inclusion of 
owners in management and administration tasks. This is a mechanism that aims to alleviate the 
informational asymmetries that may arise due to the separation between control and 
administration, with owners assuming administrators' or managers' decision-making tasks. This 
mechanism moves the company away from the benefits of specialisation. If we therefore 
consider  the importance of specialisation in the context of specific risk of investments in 
innovation, it can be seen that this mechanism is not the most opportune. Specialisation is on 
many occasions necessary, in order to have directors with the ability to administer complex 
organisational structures, diversify risk among shareholders and obtain large volumes of funds 
to acquire specific assets, as noted by Berle and Means (1932). Decreasing the divergences of 
interests because of an increase in the number of owners in management positions will make 
agency costs lower, but risky projects will not be adopted due to the failure to take advantage of 
specialisation or because there is a high degree of concentration of risk in the hands of a few   23 
owners. As can be seen  in our results, an increase in the participation of owners in 
management positions will lower the probability both of adopting R & D projects and as well as 
formalising the result of innovation in the Register of patents and utility models. 
As regard the third and final mechanism, financing in the form of debt, it can be seen that 
although around half of company financing is made up of external financing, it is not a 
significant variable in the decision to carry out investments in R & D. Our result is the opposite 
to the theories that focus on the influence of debt on the decisions made by managers in the 
investments made by companies, and are in agreement with the empirical literature, which finds 
an ambiguity in the application of this mechanism in business investment decisions. 
Finally, with regard to the variables that we introduced in our analysis that show the 
characteristics of the company's internal structure, the anticipated results were obtained. The 
effect of the size, maturity and technological opportunity in the business sector to which the 
company belongs is similar to those obtained by other authors who also analyse the innovative 
activity of Spanish companies. Finally, the market structure variables are important in the 
analysis, with the influence of competition in business decisions related to the innovative 
process especially so. 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
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TABLE  3. Correlation Matrix (Year 1994). 
 
 
TABLE 4. Correlation Matrix (Year 2000). 
 
  FORM  SHARE  EXT  PUB  MARKET  SIZE   OPORT  AGE  STOCK  OWN  DEBT 
FORM  1                     
SHARE  -0.291  1                   
EXT  -0.233  0.619  1                 
PUB  -0.024  0.098  -0.026  1               
MARKET  -0.185  0.297  0.280  0.067  1             
SIZE   -0.122  0.267  0.274  0.139  0.163  1           
OPORT  -0.112  0.249  0.219  0.064  0.110  0.149  1         
AGE  -0.261  0.195  0.201  0.069  0.239  0.200  0.156  1       
STOCK  -0.183  -0.025  0.015  -0.005  0.044  0.158  -0.013  0.123  1     
OWN  0.112  -0.296  -0.224  -0.058  -0.166  -0.139  -0.133  -0.124  -0.037  1   






















  FORM  SHARE  EXT  PUB  MARKET  SIZE   OPORT  AGE  STOCK  OWN  DEBT 
FORM  1                     
SHARE  -0.295  1                   
EXT  -0.234  0.649  1                 
PUB  -0.057  0.145  -0.055  1               
MARKET  -0.181  0.326  0.269  0.178  1             
SIZE   -0.122  0.268  0.246  0.279  0.221  1           
OPORT  -0.121  0.240  0.244  0.067  0.117  0.145  1         
AGE  -0.242  0.209  0.190  0.062  0.184  0.210  0.168  1       
STOCK  -0.238  -0.011  -0.001  0.026  0.037  0.155  -0.001  0.154  1     
OWN  0.182  -0.332  -0.257  -0.084  -0.216  -0.166  -0.169  -0.241  -0.036  1   
DEBT  0.065  -0.009  -0.033  0.052  0.019  0.018  -0.082  -0.158  -0.097  0.090  1   29 
 





























VARIABLES  CATEGORÍES  ODDS-RATIO  COEFFICIENT   STÁNDARD 
      ERROR  
WALD 
SIZE    1.001  0.001  0.000  25.944*** 
AGE    1.007  0.007  0.003  6.522** 
OPORT  Medium        23.540*** 
  Low  0.845  -0.169  0.164  1.053 
  High  1.664  0.509  0.135  14.302*** 
FORM  J. Stock Co.        22.503*** 
  Single-memb  0.117  -2.142  1.086  3.891** 
  Limited-resp.  0.455  -0.788  0.189  17.461*** 
  Workers inc.  0.721  -0.327  0.461  0.504 
  Workers coop.  0.899  -0.107  0.505  0.045 
  Others  0.356  -1.032  0.757  1.859 
STOCK  Yes  1.663  0.508  0.329  2.394 
SHARE    1.006  0.006  0.002  16.488*** 
OWN    0.006  -5.099  1.832  7.744*** 
DEBT    0.977  -0.023  0.262  0.008 
MARKET  National        52.479*** 
  Local  0.304  -1.191  0.301  15.622*** 
  Provincial  0.422  -0.864  0.262  10.885*** 
  Regional  0.389  -0.943  0.213  19.587*** 
  Foreign  1.041  0.040  0.239  0.028 
  Nat+For  1.444  0.367  0.155  5.606** 
CONST  Intercept  0.411  -0.889  0.223  15.870*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Dependent variable: INNOV 
Base category in cursive 
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VARIABLES  CATEGORÍES  ODDS-RATIO  COEFFICIENT   STÁNDARD 
      ERROR  
WALD 
SIZE    1.001  0.001  0.000  23.749*** 
AGE    1.013  0.013  0.003  17.863*** 
OPORT  Medium        12.460*** 
  Low  0.993  -0.007  0.152  0.002 
  High  1.514  0.415  0.131  9.943*** 
FORM  J. Stock Co.        12.019** 
  Single-memb  0.005  -5.280  5.648  0.874 
  Limited-resp.  0.648  -0.434  0.146  8.908*** 
  Workers inc.  0.636  -0.453  0.447  1.027 
  Workers coop.  1.031  0.030  0.490  0.004 
  Others  0.386  -0.951  0.639  2.214 
STOCK  Yes  1.939  0.662  0.345  3.680* 
SHARE    1.006  0.006  0.001  19.276*** 
OWN    0.002  -6.250  2.052  9.273*** 
DEBT    0.905  -0.099  0.266  0.140 
MARKET  National        59.299*** 
  Local  0.315  -1.156  0.315  13.506*** 
  Provincial  0.391  -0.939  0.253  13.806*** 
  Regional  0.439  -0.822  0.229  12.914*** 
  Foreign  1.595  0.467  0.204  5.250** 
  Nat+For  1.472  0.386  0.139  7.700*** 
CONST  Intercept  0.343  -1.071  0.226  22.537*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Dependent variable: INNOV 
















Critical Value: 0.5 a. 
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VARIABLES  CATEGORÍES  ODDS-RATIO  COEFFICIENT   STÁNDARD 
      ERROR  
WALD 
SIZE    1.001  0.001  0.000  29.650*** 
AGE    1.007  0.007  0.003  6.689** 
OPORT  Medium        25.218*** 
  Low  0.774  -0.256  0.163  2.475 
  High  1.622  0.484  0.134  12.965*** 
FORM  J. Stock Co.        27.634*** 
  Single-memb  0.121  -2.113  1.088  3.772* 
  Limited-resp.  0.420  -0.867  0.186  21.611*** 
  Workers inc.  0.613  -0.489  0.459  1.136 
  Workers coop.  0.723  -0.324  0.512  0.401 
  Others  0.286  -1.253  0.799  2.456 
STOCK  Yes  1.441  0.366  0.330  1.230 
EXT    1.001  0.001  0.002  0.601 
PUB    1.005  0.005  0.005  0.911 
OWN    0.001  -6.528  1.857  12.364*** 
DEBT    1.018  0.017  0.261  0.004 
MARKET  National        59.099*** 
  Local  0.292  -1.230  0.302  16.639*** 
  Provincial  0.393  -0.935  0.262  12.717*** 
  Regional  0.365  -1.007  0.214  22.179*** 
  Foreign  1.023  0.023  0.237  0.009 
  Nat+For  1.498  0.404  0.154  6.877*** 
CONST  Intercept  0.508  -0.676  0.217  9.692*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Dependent variable: INNOV 
















Critical value: 0.5 a. 
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VARIABLES  CATEGORÍES  ODDS-RATIO  COEFFICIENT   STÁNDARD 
      ERROR  
WALD 
SIZE    1.001  0.001  0.000  31.206*** 
AGE    1.013  0.012  0.003  17.064*** 
OPORT  Medium        14.242*** 
  Low  0.926  -0.077  0.150  0.267 
  High  1.508  0.411  0.131  9.856*** 
FORM  J. Stock Co.        15.790*** 
  Single-memb  0.005  -5.227  5.625  0.864 
  Limited-resp.  0.614  -0.488  0.144  11.488*** 
  Workers inc.  0.526  -0.642  0.446  2.070 
  Workers coop.  0.835  -0.180  0.492  0.134 
  Others  0.324  -1.127  0.653  2.984* 
STOCK  Yes  1.697  0.529  0.347  2.314 
EXT    1.002  0.002  0.002  1.252 
PUB    1.002  0.002  0.006  0.123 
OWN    0.000  -7.773  2.109  13.580*** 
DEBT    0.916  -0.087  0.264  0.109 
MARKET  National        65.644*** 
  Local  0.292  -1.229  0.313  15.403*** 
  Provincial  0.372  -0.989  0.252  15.354*** 
  Regional  0.423  -0.861  0.228  14.326*** 
  Foreign  1.627  0.487  0.204  5.679** 
  Nat+For  1.507  0.410  0.139  8.715*** 
CONST  Intercept  0.425  -0.855  0.219  15.260*** 
***significant at the 0.01 confidence level  
** significant at the 0.05 confidence level 
*  significant at the 0.1 confidence level 
Dependent variable: INNOV 













Undertaking R&D  Correct
share
Predicted
Critical Value:0.5 a. 
 
 